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Abstract 
 
This article provides highlights of the evolution of the health care rationing debate 
towards a more transparent and open approach involving public participation. 
Discretionary models that have dominated health sector decision-making are being 
questioned by different sectors of society. Using data from 442 college students, we 
explore public’s views on its involvement in health care rationing decisions. Findings 
suggest that although citizens wish to be consulted, they believe doctors should play the 
most important role on the rationing decisions. Nonetheless, the confidence in doctors is 
not independent of the criteria used to support their decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Health care costs have grown faster than overall economic growth in developed 
countries, making it necessary for explicit measures dealing with the distribution of 
health resources to be included on these countries’ political agendas. Although the 
strength of recent political and academic debate may suggest otherwise, the rationing of 
health care is not a new process. What is new is the debate surrounding the need to 
adopt explicit and systematic rationing policies, including the models and methods to 
adopt, the level of public involvement in decision making and how to conciliate all this 
with the maintenance of public health systems based on principles of universal 
coverage, equality of access and solidarity in financing, all of which constitute 
fundamental values in developed and democratic societies today. 
Research in health economics has sought to help in the decisions process for the 
allocation of limited health resources. The economic approaches to priority setting, 
despite having the merit of advancing the theoretical debate, seem to have had little 
effect in practical terms. The greatest objection to economic evaluation techniques is the 
inherent difficulty of conciliating efficiency principles with social principles and values. 
In this context, one possible hypothesis would be to substitute the technical criteria for a 
political process of priority setting, which would be opened up to include the 
participation of all social actors, particularly the population. The idea that society 
should participate in prioritization decisions has been widely propagated, but has not yet 
advanced to the stage of actual implementation. Although researchers seem to agree that 
obtaining the preferences of the population in health matters is a complex process, there 
is ample support for public involvement.1,2,3,4 The controversy surrounding public 
involvement in prioritization decisions involves not only an ethical debate about the 
relevance of this involvement but also a methodological debate about the weight that 
should be given to their statements, or rather, the degree of participation the public 
should be granted (advisory-based or direct intervention). Some fear that public 
understanding of rationing could undermine the population’s confidence in health 
professionals,5,6 National Health System, and social cohesion.7  
Active public participation in priority setting requires some transference of 
power and authority to this group, which could conflict with the interests of other 
groups, namely the doctors. 8, 9Jacobson and Bowling10 point out that the public debate 
on rationing is complicated by the inherent conflicts between the opinions of the general 
3 
 
population and those of the health professionals or groups of patients. A further cause 
for worry in the question of public involvement in prioritization decisions is the general 
population’s lack of technical knowledge.11, 12 Some authors point out that there is the 
risk of this process being dominated by uninformed people.13,9, 14 These aspects raise 
doubts about the value or the weight that should be attributed to the opinions of the 
population.15 According to Mullen12 the lack of definition concerning the population’s 
role in the prioritization process negatively conditions the results of their involvement. 
Paradoxically, public involvement in the rationing debate encounters resistance 
in the population itself. Studies have shown that despite the citizens’ wish to be 
consulted about health resources planning, they do not want to make direct rationing 
decisions themselves.16, 17, 18,19, 20, 21 The population seems to experience disutility when 
it finds out about, or is called upon to make decisions about the denial of treatments to 
other members of society21 due to a fear of making a wrong decision, which they may 
later come to regret.22 It would seem that regret is an important element in individual 
valorisation and in making decisions about health care.19 This idea is reinforced by 
evidence that the citizens derive utility from ignoring how the health resources are 
effectively rationalised – the “utility of ignorance” argument.5, 23 In addition, individuals 
tend to see doctors as the best group to make the decisions for society.24, 25, 20 This 
would seem to suggest that in the interests of “peace of mind”, the rationing decisions 
should be left to the doctors, whatever they decide.26  
The paper presents the analysis of the results from the Portuguese population’s 
opinions of their involvement in the planning for limited health resources, their 
designated decision-making authority for rationing, and their level of consent for the 
adoption of efficiency criteria in the allocation of resources. 
 
2. Rationing of health care in Portugal 
 
 Rationing in Portugal is not explicitly addressed in the political agenda. As is 
happening in other developed countries, the shortage of resources in the Portuguese 
SNS has become increasingly serious in recent years, especially with the increase in 
health costs. The reforms that have been carried out since the mid 1990’s, with the main 
purpose of improving efficiency and controlling the increases in health costs, adopt a 
typology of rationing which is a mixture of explicit measures taken at the macro level 
and implicit practices remaining the responsibility of the health care providers. In this 
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sense, the rationing practiced in Portugal has not involved the population in any way, 
not even at the basic level of public debate. Only sporadic cases, such as the closure of 
particular support services or maternity units which were given full media coverage, 
have recently sparked some resistance on the part of public opinion.  
There is very little information available about the preferences of the Portuguese 
population on matters relating to health services. For a revision, see Mossialos,27 Pinto 
and Aragão28 and Lopes and Magalhães.29 The actual issue of explicit rationing is not 
approached in these studies, with the exception of the work done by Pinto and Aragão28 
in the ambit of a European project, where a survey was carried out with a representative 
sample of the population on issues such as transparency and the framework for 
prioritization decisions. Regarding transparency, the citizens were questioned about the 
usefulness of a public debate on health care rationing. The majority (71.6%) of 
interviewees responded affirmatively. Concerning the framework that should uphold the 
rationing, the interviewees were given three options to choose from. The most popular 
option was the personal decision of the doctors (34.1%), followed by the political 
decision (29.5%) and, finally, the relation between the cost of the care and the medical 
benefits (29.3%). In comparison to Pinto and Aragão’s survey, our study introduces a 
wider scope in terms of decision-making authorities and the level of social actors’ 
intervention and, furthermore, tests for coherence in the respondents’ choices.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
 This study was organised according to four main objectives: firstly, to collect 
evidence of the population’s desire to have a more active role in questions relating to 
rationing; secondly, to test if the Portuguese citizens agree with findings in international 
studies reporting doctors to be the best agents for making prioritization decisions; 
thirdly to understand the determinants of this choice, and, finally, to collect evidence on 
popular acceptance of economic criteria as a framework for priority setting. A 
questionnaire was conducted in a controlled environment with a sample of 442 college 
students from six public and private institutions, located in the north and the centre of 
the country. The sample included students from different programs, namely Economics, 
Management, Psychology, Law, Medicine and Nursing. Although this is not a 
representative sample of the Portuguese population in general, we believe that students’ 
attitudes can be taken as an indicator of the attitudes of the corresponding professionals. 
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To date no other study has compared the opinion of so many different groups. The 
studies have limited their scope to comparing the opinions of doctors and the 
population,30 or the attitudes of different groups of politicians.31 
The questionnaire was designed to include three questions which have been 
properly justified in international studies.14, 32 Anand and Waillo32 tested the robustness 
of the theory of non-consequential social choice, as an alternative approach to economic 
efficiency, using a non-representative sample of the population in Leicester (United 
Kingdom). There are two questions in this questionnaire that deserve particular 
attention here. In one of the questions, the authors’ purpose was to evaluate the 
relevance of health authorities adopting a process of public consultation to determine 
health care planning. The answers obtained suggest a general support for this 
consultancy process. In the other question, the authors aimed to find out which opinion 
should prevail in the case of disagreement between the doctors and the general 
population about the financing of a certain health programme/service. The authors 
recreated a scenario in which the public financing of a specific treatment had been 
approved by referendum. The doctors, however, found that the limited health gains 
(efficiency) did not justify the channelling of resources into the provision of this 
particular service. The results corroborated the authors’ hypothesis by indicating that the 
population’s opinion is preferred by 48% of the interviewees against only 33% who 
prefer the criteria of maximisation of health gains.  
Mossialos and King14 discuss the questions raised in relation to public 
involvement in prioritization decisions, and analyse data collected about the attitude of 
the citizens towards rationing using the Eurobarometer nº 49.33 The Eurobarometer 
questionnaire included specific questions about rationing, and was conducted using 
representative samples from six EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Great 
Britain and Sweden). The authors used the data to compare the attitudes of the citizens 
from these six countries. The question in this Eurobarometer questionnaire that is of 
interest to the purposes of our study aimed to find out which agent the societies would 
nominate to make prioritization decisions. From a list of five potential actors (doctors, 
population, nurses, hospital managers and politicians), the doctors were the consistent 
choice in these countries. 
In our study, these three questions are used together in one questionnaire. The 
simultaneous use of these three questions allows an identification of the respondents’ 
understanding of what constitutes an adequate level of public involvement as well as 
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their support for the results of an economic evaluation. The first question aims to find 
out if the students think that the population should be involved in the process of health 
care rationing. The answer to this question does not allow for any indication of the level 
of public involvement. This is only addressed in a second question, which aims to 
determine the respondents’ opinion on who should be the decision-making authority in 
healthcare prioritization. Given a list of potential social actors (people in general, 
doctors, nurses, hospital managers and politicians), the respondents are questioned 
about who they think should be responsible for fixing limits in health care provision. 
Contrary to the Eurobarometer questionnaire,33 we deliberately opted to deny the 
respondents the possibility of giving multiple responses, forcing them to state the actor 
they considered the most important from among the different groups. 
The responses obtained to these two questions do not allow the identification of 
the principles guiding the respondents’ choices. That is, their opinions about whether or 
not the public should be involved in priority setting, and who should be the actual 
decision makers, do not allow the identification of whether respondents’ are indifferent 
to the criteria used by the chosen decision maker to make prioritization decisions. The 
addition of a third question in this questionnaire exploring the potential conflict 
between popular opinion and doctors’ opinion based on the principle of health gain 
maximization allows such identification, shedding light on whether the preferences for 
doctors as decision makers reported in previous studies is maintained even when 
doctors adopt economic criteria. 
 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 presents the questions posed in the questionnaire, and the main results. 
The majority of the respondents are favourable to the idea of more transparency in the 
process of priority setting independent of their academic training. Nonetheless the future 
nurses showed themselves to be the strongest defenders of public participation, while 
the medical students were the strongest opponents (30.7%). This apparent resistance on 
the part of the medical students seems to corroborate those who defend that there is a 
conflict between medical paternalism and social participation.9 
(Table 1 here) 
The application of the Pearson’s χ2 test shows that there is a significant statistical 
association between the distribution of answers to the first question and students’ 
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college program (χ2(10)=37.554; p-value<0.001; all the Pearson’s χ2 test results are 
corroborated by Fisher’s exact test). This effect is supported by the estimation results of 
a binary logit model, in which the dependent variable takes the value of one if the 
respondent agrees with public consultation and the value of zero otherwise. In addition 
to the dummy variables identifying students’ college program, explanatory variables 
include socio-demographic characteristics, health conditions and habits, political party 
and religious affiliation. Table 2 shows the definition and the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the analysis. 
(Table 2 here) 
Table 3 shows the marginal effects of the selected variables on the probability of 
agreement with public consultation in the process of priority setting. The results indicate 
that students of Economics and Management do not differentiate themselves from Law 
students (the omitted group). The students of Psychology and Nursing have a higher and 
statistically significant probability of agreeing with public consultation than the students 
of Law, at around 12 and 10 percentage points, respectively. As previously suggested, 
Medicine students show a lower probability of agreement than Law students, by about 
14 percentage points (unilateral p-value is about 5%). 
Some of the control variables introduced also reveal statistically significant 
effects on the probability of the respondents agreeing with public consultation in the 
process of priority setting. In fact, the results show that, everything else the same, male 
respondents are on average 11 percentage points less likely to agree with public 
consultation than female respondents. Similarly, individuals with a family income 
higher than the sample’s average show a lower probability of agreeing with public 
consultation (at around 8 percentage points) than those with an income lower than the 
sample’s average. Conversely, unmarried individuals and those who have private health 
insurance reveal a higher probability of agreeing with public consultation. The effects of 
the party affiliation variables show that those individuals belonging to the Portuguese 
Communist Party are more strongly in favour of public consultation, with all other party 
affiliations yielding strongly negative effects. 
 
(Table 3 here) 
Concerning the second question in the questionnaire, the results in Table 1 and 4 
reveal that the majority of respondents (57%) believe that doctors should be the main 
agents for healthcare prioritization decisions. The results also seem to indicate that 
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society does not trust politicians to make those decisions. After the doctors, the 
respondents elected the general public (17%) as the decision-making agent, albeit at a 
significantly distance from the doctors (the test for equality of proportions yields a 
statistic z = -12.416 with a p-value<0.001). The preferences revealed by our sample of 
students are, in general, consistent with those obtained by Mossialos and King14 and 
Pinto and Aragão.28 Although multiple answers were not permitted in our study, 10.9% 
of our interviewees responded spontaneously that the prioritization decisions should be 
made by a multidisciplinary team. The nursing students (52.4%) and the medical 
students (20%) were alone in opting to give this spontaneous answer. 
 
(Table 4 here) 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the 
probability of selecting each one of the alternatives considered. The results show that 
the individuals who disagree with public consultations are less likely to select the public 
as the decision-maker in priority setting than those individuals who remain neutral 
concerning public consultations. Likewise, Medical students (and those who have 
private medical insurance) are less likely to select the public as the decision-maker in 
priority setting than Law students (than those who do not have private medical 
insurance). The results’ concerning the choice of doctors reveal that Management and 
Nursing students exhibit a lower probability of choosing the doctors as the decision-
makers than Law students. Keeping everything else the same, the probability of 
selecting the doctors is also lower among the unmarried and the smokers. On the other 
hand, the students of Psychology, those that have an income equal to the average 
income in the sample, and those from the Portuguese People’s Party have a higher 
probability of choosing the doctors as the decision-makers in priority setting. 
 
(Table 5 here) 
An analysis of the responses to the third question allows us to conclude that, in 
the case of conflict, the respondents select the opinion of the doctors, reinforcing the 
previous conclusions. These results contrast with the findings of Anand and Waillo.32 
Table 6 presents the marginal effects of the selected variables on the probability of 
favouring the opinion of the doctors. The results indicate that, compared to the 
individuals who selected ‘Other Professionals’ in Question 2 or declared themselves 
neutral, those individuals who selected the general public as the decision-maker in 
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priority setting are 33.5 percentage points less likely to favour the opinion of the doctors 
in the case of conflict with public opinion. The Psychology students also exhibit a 27 
percentage point’s lower probability of agreeing with the opinion of the doctors than the 
Law students. An increase in family size exerts a negative and statistically significant 
marginally effect on the probability of agreeing with the opinion of the doctors. On the 
other hand, those individuals with an average income and those suffering from a chronic 
disease have a higher probability of agreeing with the opinion of the doctors. The effect 
of the party affiliation variables shows that, with the exception of individuals of the 
People’s Party, all show a lower probability of agreeing with the opinion of the doctors 
than the individuals of the Communist Party.  
(Table 6 here) 
One important result from the previous analysis is the lack of a statistically 
significant effect of the variable Q2-Doctors on the probability of agreeing with the 
opinion of the doctors. It would be expected that those individuals who select the 
doctors (public) as the decision-maker in priority setting would also favour the opinion 
of the doctors (public) in the case of conflict in the adopted prioritization criteria. This 
result suggests that the dominant choice for doctors as the main decision-makers in 
priority setting observed in international samples may not be independent of the 
decision criteria adopted by them in the allocation of resources.  
The results presented in Table 7 show the factors that influence the probability 
of disagreeing with the criteria adopted by the selected actors for priority setting. Model 
1 is estimated using the subsample of individuals that selected the doctors as the main 
decision-makers in priority setting and Model 2 is estimated using the subsample of 
individuals that selected the general public as the main decision-maker. 
The results indicate that it is the Psychology students (Medicine) who, having 
selected the doctors as the decision-makers, have a higher (lower) probability of 
disagreeing with the criteria adopted by the doctors in these decisions. The results also 
show that individuals with an average income and those with a chronic disease are less 
likely to disagree with the opinion of the doctors. The variables concerning political 
orientation also reveal that the individuals of the Communist Party, who also selected 
the doctors as the decision-makers in priority setting, have a higher probability of 
disagreeing with the criteria adopted by the doctors. 
 
(Table 7 here) 
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Concerning the individuals who selected the general public as the decision-
makers in priority setting, it is found that the students of Economics, Management and 
Psychology have lower probability of disagreeing with public opinion in the case of 
conflict with the “maximizing” criteria adopted by the doctors. Older individuals, those 
with more numerous families, and those who suffer from a chronic disease also exhibit 
a lower probability of disagreeing with public opinion. On the other hand, individuals 
with an income higher or equal to the average sample income, those that smoke, and 
those that regularly drink alcoholic beverages are those with the higher probability of 
disagreeing with the opinion of the public. As previously, the variables of political 
orientation reveal that individuals of the Communist Party, who also selected the 
general public as the decision-maker in priority setting, have a higher probability of 
disagreeing with public opinion. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Health care rationing is a complex and controversial issue. Recent discussions 
on the theme have focused on whether rationing, which occurs in virtually all public 
health systems, should assume an explicit character and what level of public 
involvement the process should have.  
This study attempts to contribute to the debate on public participation in the 
allocation of limited health care resources in Portugal, where there is an increasingly 
urgent need to establish limits on what is publically financed. The results obtained in 
this study indicate that the Portuguese respondents are calling for public involvement in 
the process of priority setting. However, and in accordance with various international 
studies, the results also suggest that the dominant preference is to give the public an 
advisory role and not a participative role, with prioritization decisions being primarily 
conferred on the doctors. One important result in our study is the finding that the 
Portuguese doctors (taking medical students’ opinion as indicators) do not reject the 
responsibility of priority setting decisions. Using the taxonomy of Obermann and Buck, 
26
 the overall results suggest that the Portuguese would opt for an “open” process of 
priority setting concerning its transparency. 
In relation to the second aspect of this taxonomy, ie. the mode of prioritization, 
contrary to what has been observed in various international studies, the Portuguese 
respondents in our study revealed a clear preference for the health gains criteria adopted 
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by the doctors over the criteria defended by the public. The results therefore suggest that 
Portuguese choose a “systematic” process for the mode of priority setting. The 
robustness of this result is measured in our study by a comparison between the revealed 
preferences for the decision-maker and the revealed preferences for the decision criteria. 
If the choice for doctors (or other professionals) as decision-makers is a mere translation 
of the “utility of ignorance” argument, a concurrence between the choice of the 
decision-maker and the criteria – whatever they may be adopted by the decision-maker 
should be observed. This concurrence was not totally observed in our study. Only 44% 
of the respondents who selected the general public as the decision-maker explicitly 
agreed with its criteria for the allocation of resources, and about 70% of those who 
selected the professionals agreed with the cost-effectiveness criteria adopted by the 
doctors in the given scenario. It was further verified that it is the future doctors who 
showed a higher probability of agreeing with the cost-effectiveness criteria. These 
respondents also showed a lower probability of disagreeing with these criteria than all 
the other respondents who selected the doctors as the prioritization decision-making 
agents. 
Thus, although a total adherence to cost-effectiveness criteria is not observed, 
the results obtained in this questionnaire indicate that, in complete opposition to the 
“state of the art” in Portugal in matters of health care rationing (characterised as “hidden 
and non-systematic”), the process that emerges as the “best solution” for the country is 
the “open and systematic” rationing characterised by Obermann and Buck26 as: (a) the 
public calls for “open” rationing, and (b) requires rigour in its formulation, comprises 
economic criteria, it is accepted by the doctors, and conforms with the preferences of 
the majority of the population. Naturally, this result must be read within the context of 
the limitations of the sample used, but it still constitutes an indication of an existing 
contradiction in Portugal between the political option that has been adopted in rationing 
and the aspirations of the population, suggesting an urgent need for an open debate and 
a large and representative consultation of the Portuguese population on these matters. 
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Table 1. Survey questions and results by college degree 
Questions Econo 
(%) 
Manag 
(%) 
Law 
(%) 
Psycol 
(%) 
Medic 
(%) 
Nurse 
(%) 
Total 
Q1. Some people argue that health 
authorities should conduct consultation 
exercises (public meetings, asking 
groups made up from the public) to 
determine what health care treatments 
are provided. Do you agree? 
Agree 
Disagree 
Neutral 
74.29 
22.86 
2.86 
78.64 
16.50 
4.85 
82.50 
15.00 
2.50 
92.73 
1.82 
5.45 
68.00 
30.67 
1.33 
96.83 
3.17 
0.00 
80.50 
16.55 
2.95 
Q2. If limits need to be set, who should 
decide which types of treatment are 
given a higher priority? 
General public 
Doctors 
Nurses 
Managers of health services 
Politicians 
Spontaneous response –
“multidisciplinary” 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
14.29 
63.81 
0.00 
20.95 
0.95 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
 
18.45 
51.46 
0.00 
16.50 
3.88 
 
0.00 
9.71 
 
 
 
17.50 
67.50 
0.00 
10.00 
2.50 
 
0.00 
2.50 
 
 
 
30.91 
65.45 
0.00 
1.82 
1.82 
 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
 
6.67 
72.00 
0.00 
1.33 
0.00 
 
20.00 
0.00 
 
 
 
17.46 
23.81 
0.00 
3.17 
3.17 
 
52.38 
0.00 
 
 
 
16.78 
57.14 
0.00 
10.66 
2.04 
 
10.88 
2.49 
Q3. If a health authority conducts a poll, 
which shows that, the majority of people 
think that a particular treatment should 
be provided, but doctors argue that it is 
rarely successful and should not be 
provided, what to you thing should 
happen? 
The treatment should be provided  
The treatment should not be provided  
Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.10 
72.38 
9.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38.83 
52.43 
8.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35.00 
57.50 
7.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45.45 
34.55 
20.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.67 
89.33 
4.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25.81 
58.06 
16.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27.05 
62.50 
10.45 
N 105 103 40 55 75 63 441 
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Table 2. Definition of variables and descriptive statistics for the sample 
Variables Description Mean(sd) 
Law Dummy variable equal to 1 if law student,  0 otherwise 0.09 
Economics Dummy variable equal to 1 if economics student,  0 otherwise 0.24 
Management Dummy variable equal to 1 if management student,  0 otherwise 0.24 
Psychology Dummy variable equal to 1 if psychology student,  0 otherwise 0.12 
Medicine Dummy variable equal to 1 if Medicine student,  0 otherwise 0.17 
Nursing Dummy variable equal to 1 if Nursing student,  0 otherwise 0.14 
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if male,  0 otherwise 0.43 
Age Age in years 24.30(7.26) 
Single Dummy variable equal to 1 if single,  0 otherwise 0.85 
Nfamily Number of people in the individual’s household 3.58(1.05) 
Inc1 Dummy variable equal to 1 if household income group of the 
individual is below the sample average,  0 otherwise 0.50 
Inc2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if household income group of the 
individual is equal to the sample average,  0 otherwise 0.13 
Inc3 Dummy variable equal to 1 if household income group of the 
individual is above the sample average,  0 otherwise 0.37 
Insurance Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has private health 
insurance,  0 otherwise 0.37 
Smoker Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual currently smokes,  0 
otherwise 0.33 
Ncigs Typical number of cigarettes the individual smokes per day 2.96(6.06) 
Drinker Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual currently drinks 
alcoholic beverages,  0 otherwise 0.70 
Chronic Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual reports suffering from 
a chronic disease,  0 otherwise 0.10 
Severe Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual reports having 
suffered (or anyone in his/her household) from a severe disease,  0 
otherwise 0.35 
Religion Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual holds religious views,  
0 otherwise 0.78 
CP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favors the communist 
party,  0 otherwise 0.02 
LB Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favors the left-bloc 
party,  0 otherwise 0.05 
PP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favors the people’s 
party,  0 otherwise 0.03 
SDP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favors the social-
democratic party,  0 otherwise 0.24 
SP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favors the socialist 
party,  0 otherwise 0.24 
OtherP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual favors other party,  0 
otherwise 0.03 
NoP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual does not favor any 
political party,  0 otherwise 0.39 
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Table 3. Binomial logit estimates of probability of agreeing with public consultation 
Variable Estimate SE p-value 95% confidence intervals 
Economics -0.032 0.060 0.589 -0.150 0.085 
Management 0.012 0.055 0.827 -0.095 0.119 
Psychology 0.121 0.031 0.000 0.061 0.181 
Medicine -0.139 0.084 0.099 -0.305 0.026 
Nursing 0.097 0.038 0.011 0.022 0.173 
Male -0.114 0.034 0.001 -0.181 -0.047 
Age 0.003 0.004 0.403 -0.004 0.011 
Single 0.281 0.163 0.086 -0.040 0.601 
Nfamily 0.014 0.015 0.359 -0.016 0.043 
Inc2 -0.046 0.059 0.429 -0.161 0.068 
Inc3 -0.081 0.039 0.038 -0.158 -0.004 
Insurance 0.057 0.029 0.044 0.002 0.113 
Smoker -0.059 0.047 0.211 -0.151 0.033 
Ncigs 0.003 0.003 0.431 -0.004 0.009 
Drinker 0.055 0.036 0.135 -0.017 0.126 
Chronic 0.041 0.041 0.323 -0.040 0.122 
Severe -0.033 0.031 0.277 -0.094 0.027 
Religion 0.039 0.038 0.307 -0.036 0.114 
LB -0.940 0.009 0.000 -0.958 -0.922 
PP -0.920 0.012 0.000 -0.943 -0.896 
SDP -0.994 0.001 0.000 -0.996 -0.991 
SP -0.993 0.001 0.000 -0.996 -0.991 
OtherP -0.912 0.013 0.000 -0.937 -0.888 
NoP -0.995 0.002 0.000 -0.999 -0.991 
Note: N=433 responses; Log-pseudolikelihood value is -173.82; Wald test for the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero has a χ2 value of 727.70 with 24 df, implying a 
p-value less than 0.001. 
 
 
Table 4. Who should decide priorities?  
 
General 
Public Doctors Nurses 
Hospital 
Managers Politicians 
Don’t 
Know N 
(%) 16.8 
 
57.1 
 
0.0 
 
10.7 
 
2.0 
 
2.5 
 
441 
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Table 5. Multinomial logit estimates – Q2 
 General Public  Doctors  Others/Don’t 
Know 
Variable Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate   SE 
Q1-
Disagree -0.207
**
 0.032  0.016 0.242  0.191 0.246 
Q1-Agree -0.002 0.016  -0.159 0.135  0.161 0.136 
Economics -0.004 0.010  -0.081 0.117  0.084 0.117 
Manageme
nt 0.003 0.011 
 
-0.280** 0.129  0.277** 0.131 
Psychology 0.020 0.020  0.174** 0.089  -0.194** 0.087 
Medicine -0.014** 0.007  -0.066 0.121  0.080 0.122 
Nursing -0.003 0.010  -0.541** 0.110  0.544** 0.113 
Male 0.005 0.007  0.046 0.057  -0.051 0.056 
Age 0.001 0.001  -0.004 0.006  0.004 0.006 
Single 0.011 0.008  -0.230** 0.075  0.219** 0.074 
Nfamily 0.003 0.003  -0.025 0.026  0.022 0.026 
Inc2 -0.007 0.008  0.215** 0.048  -0.208** 0.047 
Inc3 0.004 0.007  0.004 0.061  -0.008 0.060 
Insurance -0.012** 0.006  -0.035 0.058  0.047 0.058 
Smoker 0.008 0.010  -0.150* 0.084  0.142* 0.084 
Ncigs -0.001 0.001  -0.004 0.007  0.005 0.007 
Drinker 0.002 0.006  -0.085 0.055  0.083 0.054 
Chronic 0.001 0.010  -0.043 0.085  0.042 0.085 
Severe 0.002 0.006  0.062 0.052  -0.064 0.051 
Religion 0.006 0.006  0.004 0.067  -0.010 0.067 
LB 0.023 0.044  0.091 0.179  -0.113 0.169 
PP 0.024 0.051  0.206** 0.089  -0.230** 0.061 
SDP 0.008 0.024  0.095 0.195  -0.103 0.191 
SP 0.023 0.032  0.023 0.216  -0.047 0.210 
OtherP 0.040 0.066  -0.162 0.311  0.122 0.316 
NoP 0.013 0.022  0.098 0.211  -0.111 0.207 
Note: N=432 responses; Log-pseudolikelihood value is -343.38; Wald test for the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero has a χ2 value of 6126.83 with 52 df, implying a 
p-value less than 0.001. Hausman specification test for the IIA assumption has χ2 value 
of 1.14 with 17 df, yielding no evidence that the IIA assumption has been violated. **p-
value≤.05, * p-value≤.10 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 6. Binomial logit estimates of probability of favoring the doctors’ opinion 
Variable Estimate SE p-value 95% confidence intervals 
Q2-Public -0.335 0.088 0.000 -0.508 -0.162 
Q2-Doctors 4×10-4 0.065 0.995 -0.127 0.128 
Economics 0.124 0.087 0.152 -0.046 0.293 
Management -0.105 0.104 0.310 -0.309 0.098 
Psychology -0.267 0.135 0.048 -0.531 -0.003 
Medicine 0.295 0.065 0.000 0.168 0.422 
Nursing 0.058 0.099 0.562 -0.137 0.252 
Male 0.069 0.060 0.255 -0.050 0.187 
Age 0.002 0.006 0.728 -0.010 0.014 
Single 0.193 0.120 0.107 -0.042 0.428 
Nfamily -0.045 0.027 0.088 -0.098 0.007 
Inc2 0.187 0.061 0.002 0.067 0.306 
Inc3 0.102 0.062 0.101 -0.020 0.223 
Insurance -0.080 0.061 0.187 -0.199 0.039 
Smoker -0.032 0.085 0.704 -0.199 0.134 
Ncigs 0.012 0.006 0.044 0.000 0.024 
Drinker 0.115 0.060 0.057 -0.003 0.233 
Chronic 0.190 0.065 0.004 0.062 0.319 
Severe -0.019 0.056 0.737 -0.129 0.092 
Religion 0.014 0.064 0.831 -0.112 0.140 
LB -0.514 0.138 0.000 -0.784 -0.244 
PP -0.347 0.222 0.117 -0.781 0.087 
SDP -0.478 0.175 0.006 -0.821 -0.135 
SP -0.480 0.173 0.005 -0.819 -0.142 
NoP -0.466 0.170 0.006 -0.799 -0.132 
Note: N=420 responses; Log-pseudolikelihood value is -228.07; Wald test for the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero has a χ2 value of 73.76 with 25 df, implying a p-
value less than 0.001. Explanatory variable OtherP was dropped due to perfect 
prediction of the dependent variable. 
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Table 7. Binomial logit estimates of probability of disagreeing with adopted criteria 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Disagree with Doctors  Disagree with Public 
Variable Estimate      SE p-Value 95% CI  Estimate SE p-
value 
95% CI 
 
Economics -0.081 0.082 0.326 0.242 0.080 
 
-0.638 0.161 0.000 0.953 0.323 
Management 0.043 0.102 0.673 0.157 0.243  -0.606 0.187 0.001 0.973 0.239 
Psychology 0.359 0.163 0.028 0.040 0.679  -0.493 0.231 0.033 0.945 0.040 
Medicine -0.263 0.061 0.000 0.382 0.144  -0.267 0.305 0.381 0.864 0.330 
Nursing -0.125 0.087 0.150 0.294 0.045  -0.369 0.257 0.151 0.873 0.135 
Male -0.041 0.068 0.546 0.174 0.092  0.162 0.235 0.491 0.299 0.622 
Age -0.004 0.007 0.574 0.017 0.009  -0.056 0.019 0.003 0.092 0.019 
Single -0.182 0.148 0.218 0.472 0.107  0.303 0.303 0.316 0.290 0.897 
Nfamily 0.052 0.032 0.108 0.011 0.114  -0.272 0.100 0.007 0.469 0.076 
Inc2 -0.114 0.064 0.072 0.239 0.010  0.454 0.131 0.001 0.198 0.710 
Inc3 0.007 0.072 0.924 0.134 0.148  0.427 0.184 0.020 0.067 0.786 
Insurance 0.071 0.067 0.289 0.060 0.203  -0.332 0.203 0.102 0.730 0.066 
Smoker 0.039 0.100 0.693 0.157 0.236  0.215 0.291 0.460 0.355 0.785 
Ncigs -0.012 0.008 0.117 0.028 0.003  0.063 0.022 0.004 0.021 0.106 
Drinker -0.087 0.075 0.250 0.235 0.061  0.670 0.114 0.000 0.447 0.894 
Chronic -0.197 0.057 0.001 0.309 0.084  -0.469 0.152 0.002 0.767 0.171 
Severe -0.028 0.065 0.666 0.154 0.099  0.189 0.217 0.382 0.235 0.614 
Religion 0.042 0.068 0.536 0.091 0.176  0.005 0.265 0.984 0.515 0.525 
LB 0.882 0.021 0.000 0.840 0.923  0.695 0.079 0.000 0.541 0.850 
PP 0.843 0.027 0.000 0.791 0.896  0.570 0.098 0.000 0.377 0.762 
SDP 0.995 0.002 0.000 0.992 0.998  0.873 0.051 0.000 0.773 0.972 
SP 0.987 0.003 0.000 0.982 0.993  0.965 0.022 0.000 0.922 1.007 
NoP 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.998 1.000  0.983 0.013 0.000 0.957 1.008 
Note: N=240 (70) responses for model 1 (model2); Log-pseudolikelihood value is -
120.22 (-28.50) for model 1 (model 2); Wald test for the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero has a χ2 value of 582.70 (225.44) with 23 df, implying a p-value 
less than 0.001 for model 1 (model 2).  
